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Abstract
In the absence of sufficient cognitive stimulation, intelligence
— and with it, a capacity for learning new things — tends
to degrade with age. In this paper I explore a novel hypoth-
esis: that this may be an adaptive solution, since learning is
facilitated by temporarily inhibiting action selection and thus
introducing temporal delays. An older animal that is not be-
ing cognitively challenged may be in a sufficiently stable en-
vironment that reducing the delay before action at the cost of
also reducing learning capacity may be a sensible tradeoff. I
support parts of this model by matching a simulation of it to
known reaction-time results, and by providing an account for
previously unexplained task-learning results in adult and aged
macaques
Keywords: inhibition ; learning; action selection; transitive
inference; primate task learning; consciousness.
Introduction
In the absence of sufficient cognitive stimulation, intelligence
— and with it, a capacity for learning new things — tends to
degrade with age (Schaie et al., 2004). In contemporary cul-
ture, we face the prospect of reduced intelligence with some
trepidation, and for good cause. In humans, intelligence is
correlated with both health and longevity (Deary et al., 2004).
We can take comfort, though, in the lack of sufficient stimu-
lation aspect of these findings. For many individuals, intelli-
gence increases over the course of their life (See Figure 1).
“[I]nvolvement in a complex and intellectually stimulating
environment” (Schaie et al., 2004, p. 311), whether vocation-
based or as a consequence of being partnered with a “high
cognitive status” spouse (Gruber-Baldini et al., 1995) is one
of the main correlates of maintaining one’s IQ into old age.
Why should intelligence be a “use it or lose it” type of
trait? There may be a simple metabolic explanation as in
muscle tone. Neurons are highly plastic so may be open to
metabolic optimisation, if the capacity for intelligence (as
well as thought itself) has metabolic cost. In this paper I con-
centrate on a hypothetical second, complimentary cost: think-
ing and learning take time. Time is costly for two reasons:
1. Competition with others. For social organisms, individu-
als compete with other agents with very nearly equivalent
needs and capabilities (e.g. Schaik & Noordwijk, 1988).
Organisms also face competition for resources with other
species, the ultimate example being predation.
2. Time is itself a finite resource. An organism has a fi-
nite lifespan and daily tasks associated with metabolic de-
mands. The consequence of this is an evolved time bud-
Figure 1: Age-corrected IQ correlations (Moray House Test)
from the 1921 birth cohort from Lothian county, Scotland.
After Deary et al. (2004, Fig. 3, p. 135)
get for activities that are mutually exclusive (Dunbar, 1992;
Bryson & Tanguy, 2009).
Since cognition takes time, in the absence of advantage from
that cognition it is adaptive to think as little as possible.
Put another way, the quality of an animal’s existing model
should affect its propensity to explore rather than exploit. An
animal that has developed reliable skills and/or a good, pre-
dictive model of the environment should be more inclined to
exploit its knowledge than one that has not. Indeed, learn-
ing happens at a higher rate the more unpredictable an animal
finds a reward regime (Waelti et al., 2001; Holroyd & Coles,
2002; Belavkin & Ritter, 2003).
We already know that animals that are uncertain also take
longer to decide and act (Palmer et al., 2005; Huk & Shadlen,
2005; Bogacz et al., 2006). In these experiments, uncertainty
is often generated by weak sensory stimuli or limited prior
experience of categories to be discriminated or actions to be
expressed. Here I hypothesise another, more general factor
determining the amount of time at least some species spend
thinking before they act.
In this paper I focus primarily on a study of the effects of
aging in rhesus macaques. Macaques were until very recently
in evolutionary time the most successful genus of primates.
Like hominids, macaques are highly social, highly cognitive,
and found in diverse ecosystems ranging from tropical to tem-
perate. The study, by Rapp et al. (1996), shows that aged
rhesus macaques have two peculiarities in their task-learning
performance. First, they do not exhibit a reaction time (RT)
effect traditionally attributed to computation the task requires,
yet their performance is identical to younger animals that do.
Second, they do not learn new behaviour when their reward
schedule changes, unlike younger animals.
My interpretation of these results is that the RT associated
with this task is completely independent of the task perfor-
mance, but rather indicative of a general-purpose learning
system which allocates time-consuming cognitive resources
based on uncertainty in action selection. I argue that this
general-purpose system may be attenuated by aging, and
speculate that it may be correlated with conscious attention.
Proposed Global Model for Allocating
Cognitive Resources
In this section I briefly review the adaptive tradeoffs influ-
encing aging, then I review an established model explaining
reaction-time results in a cognitive vision task. From this I
propose a general definition and description of cognition, and
propose a model of how cognitive resources are allocated.
The following sections pertain to data supporting this model.
Evolution and Aging
Life is often defined in terms of a capacity to replicate. Dar-
win (1859) proposed an explanation for the diversity of life
we see by showing how a process of generating an oversupply
of diverse offspring which then compete for finite resources
leads to systematic sorts of changes in number and charac-
teristics of species. This explanation of biological evolution
has been refined to show that competition between individu-
als is essentially a proxy for competition between what truly
replicates (Dawkins, 1976). Genes form coalitions expressed
as organisms, but the organisms compete not necessarily for
their own survival, but rather for strategies most likely to
propagate as many of their genes as possible into the future.
Since both evolution and other non-biological environmen-
tal forces generate constant change in an ecosystem, it is gen-
erally not in a replicator’s best interests to inhabit one rigidly-
defined organism. Thus many organisms express life histo-
ries where generations turn over at a high rate. Offspring
carry newer genomes than their parents with incrementally
more and newer input from selection. However, other or-
ganisms exploit niches where benefits of long life tradeoff
more strongly against the benefits of evolutionary approaches
to learning. For example, trees exploit size to increase access
to light and water and to escape some forms of predation. Ac-
quiring size though takes time.
Some animal species also exploit size and its associated
longevity, probably initially for similar reasons as some
plants do. However, animals also evolved a capacity for indi-
vidual learning which provides further benefit, though also
associated costs (Barrickman et al., 2008). For example,
many social species transmit behaviour not only genetically
but through social learning, but reliably acquiring behaviour
this way takes time ( ˇCacˇe & Bryson, 2007).
There are two reasons then that it might be adaptive for
older animals to reduce their propensity for learning. First,
an animal that has been successful for a long time in a fixed
environment is likely to have already acquired an adequate
behaviour repertoire. Secondly, in a condition where an envi-
ronment is changing in ways an experienced animal is unable
to anticipate, the tradeoff concerning individual vs. genetic
learning may shift. It may become more important to favour
genetic evolution to the disadvantage of older animals, even
if they are still able to reproduce.
Cognition, Learning, Action and Time
I now return to the question of the relationship between time
and cognitive behaviour. First, I propose a definition:
Cognition is the process of search an agent goes through
when its next action is not readily apparent.
Further, I propose this process consists of:
1. fixing attention on an aspect of the present behaviour con-
text, and
2. searching the expected consequences of potential actions
that are primed by this context.
At an explicit level, we consciously experience processes
similar to this. The search for a next action persists until we
find a solution that passes some threshold criteria for “cor-
rect” or “good enough”, or until we “give up”. But why and
when do we give up? And how much of this process is really
under conscious control? My suggestion is that the priming
of potential actions is automatic once attention is fixed on
the task, and that in absence of explicit success criteria, the
cognitive resources we devote to this task are inversely corre-
lated with our confidence about the current leading candidate
action.
To rephrase my proposal, the less certain we are about our
next action, the longer we inhibit our performance of that ac-
tion. While our selection is inhibited and our attention is on
the task, an automated process searches for other candidate
actions, attending to one at a time. Each such discovered ac-
tion is tested against an internal model derived from experi-
ence (expectations). If an action is found about which we are
more certain of a positive outcome, our behaviour expression
becomes proportionally less inhibited. When the inhibition
times out, the current best candidate action is expressed and
its outcome observed.
This model is not entirely novel; it derives from two estab-
lished ones. The first is the well-established model described
by Wolfe et al. (2000) of conjunctive visual search. Vision
research has identified a number of properties, such as colour
and shape, which are called “pop-out properties” (Treisman
& Gelade, 1980). A subject conducting visual search for such
a property takes the same amount of time to find an exemplar
regardless of the number of distracting items. However, if one
must search for an item that combines two pop-out properties,
time becomes dependent on the number of distracters. For ex-
ample, one can easily find the only green T in a field of Ts,
or the only L in a field of Ts, but finding the only green L in
a field composed of brown and green Ts and brown Ls takes
time proportional either to the number of green objects or the
number of Ls. Wolfe et al. (2000) propose that these reaction-
time results indicate that the task is solved by randomly sam-
pling from a pool of candidates determined by pop-out for
one property, then testing whether the sample candidate also
has the second property.
My account of action selection extends from this model
by assuming the pool of candidate actions are primed from
memory rather than gathered from the visual field. It con-
forms in that the candidates’ evaluation is necessarily sequen-
tial, presumably due to a cognitive constraint. For example,
th comparisons required could require hippocampal process-
ing (Van Elzakker et al., 2003), which we know has task-
dependent representations (Kobayashi et al., 1997). To the
extent that my account proposes attention being directed by
uncertainty in action selection, it is also similar to the account
of Norman & Shallice (1986).
Transitive Performance: A Model Task
Transitive performance is a standard cognitive task used in
experimental psychology. Transitive inference (TI) formally
refers to the process of reasoning whereby one infers that if,
for some quality, A > B and B > C, then A > C. In some do-
mains, such as integers or heights, this property will hold for
any A, B or C, though for others it does not. Though classi-
cally described as an example of concrete operational thought
(Piaget, 1954), it has now been demonstrated in a variety of
animals and young children not normally considered to be ca-
pable of advanced cognition (Grosenick et al., 2007). The be-
haviour of choosing A from AC without training after having
previously been trained to select A from AB and B from BC is
consequently referred to as “transitive performance” (TP).
Representations Underlying TP
A variety of models have been proposed to to explain pre-
/non-operational transitive performance. Each implies its
own processes and representations (see Fig. 2.)
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Figure 2: Three sorts of representations that may underlie
expressed transitive inference. See text for details. a, weights
associated directly with stimuli on the basis of the stimuli’s
association with reward. b stimuli ordered within a single
index. c stimuli both ordered and associated with an action.
• a simple association: a reinforcement weight is paired with
each individual stimulus; when more than one stimuli is
present, the most reinforced one is selected. This represen-
tation is discriminated from others listed here in that items
in the middle of the series may have no significant differ-
ence in weight (Frank et al., 2003). This representation is
most closely associated with the value-transfer model, and
is well-supported for explaining TP in birds (von Fersen et
al., 1991; Zentall & Sherburne, 1994)
• b innately sequential: each value is associated with an or-
dinal index in a series or a value selected from a gradient;
two items are compared by using their indexical values.
This representation can be discriminated by generalisations
(or mistakes) across series, e.g. the 3rd item of one series
may be inserted as the 3rd item of another series. This
representation has been convincingly modelled in a related
literature on human series learning (Henson, 1998) and has
been favoured by many modellers (e.g. Frank et al., 2003).
A problem with this model is explaining how subjects de-
termine that TP stimuli form a sequence.
• c prioritised associations: an ordered set of paired asso-
ciations between stimuli and actions; each stimuli is as-
sociated with an action (e.g. select the stimuli). If there
are actions associated with more than one present stim-
uli, whichever stimulus has the highest priority takes the
agent’s attention and determines its behaviour. This repre-
sentation can be discriminated from the others by the fact
that it fails systematically when three stimuli are presented,
even though TP is observed for any pair. It is the only
model fully consistent with human and other primate be-
havioural data on three-item performance (McGonigle &
Chalmers, 1977; Chalmers & McGonigle, 1984; Bryson
& Leong, 2007). It is also parsimonious in that it does
not assume the recognition of a sequence. Rather, it as-
sumes prioritising associations is a standard part of task-
learning, an assumption quite similar to that made by the
well-established ACT-R model of human learning (Wood
et al., 2004).
The Two-Tier Model
In previous work we have simulated the prioritised associa-
tive model of transitive performance (Bryson & Leong, 2007;
Wood et al., 2004). We called our model the two-tier model,
to emphasise the fact that we were proposing two concurrent
disjoint learning tasks. One tier learns the of paired asso-
ciation between stimuli and one of two actions: select or
inhibit selection (Harris & McGonigle, 1994). Another tier
learns a prioritisation of these rules. Of course, because this
learning system is modular it can easily be trapped in local
minima. Though apparently a disadvantage, the difficulties
our simulation has learning the original adjacent pairs mod-
els the difficulty of live subjects. Both our simulation and
real animals need orderly training to reliably master the task,
and even so some agents fail to meet criteria. Further, the
errors made by our system are consistent with those made
by live subjects. The modules we propose are consistent
with one of the leading theories of hippocampal functioning
(Baxter & Murray, 2001; Heckers et al., 2004; Alvarado &
Bachevalier, 2005).Modularity is adaptive because intelligent
solutions are only useful if they are computationally tractable
(Bryson, 2002).
Explaining the Symbolic Distance Effect
I now return to testing the action-selection model described
in Section . The two-tier model has been shown to account
for all the known characteristics of TP with one exception,
the Symbolic Distance Effect (SDE). The SDE is a charac-
teristic reaction time (RT) effect; one that first drew interest
to TP as a learning task (Bryant & Trabasso, 1971). When
subjects execute a transitive comparison, they operate faster
the further away two items are in the implied sequence. For
example, a correct decision on BD would be slower than one
on BE, even if E is not the last item in the sequence1
If TP were performed by simple inference, then items fur-
ther apart would be expected to take longer, because more
inferences have to be performed. That they are in fact faster
helped motivate the innately sequential theories described
earlier, as researchers tried to conceive an internal represen-
tation where further-removed stimuli were easier to discrim-
inate (Bryant & Trabasso, 1971). However, the SDE is not a
reliable individual effect, only an aggregate one (McGonigle
& Chalmers, 1992). This is another factor in favour of pri-
oritised association models, since they allow individual dif-
ferences in the order of representation (Harris & McGonigle,
1994; Wood et al., 2004).
In the two-tier model, priorities of the associated stimu-
lus / action pairs are normalised such that each pair had a
value between 0 and 1, and all the priority values add up to 1.
This paper’s action-selection hypothesis assumes RT should
be correlated with certainty in action choice. Here I propose
“certainty” be modelled as the distance between the priorities
of any two stimuli. I examined these values for a population
of 144 agents with a wide range of individual learning pa-
rameters, the same range reported in Bryson & Leong (2007).
These were trained on adjacent pairs drawn from seven stim-
uli, A–G. The agents for the present experiment were never
exposed to transitive test pairs, so these could not affect their
priority values. Although there is a large variety of individual




is 2.034, with ninety-five percent confidence intervals in the
range [1.98,2.09] (SD = 0.33,SE = .03). In other words, if
the reaction time for the two-tier model is set proportional
to the absolute difference between the priorities for the stim-
1End items are by far the easiest stimuli in TP, because unlike in-
tervening items they are uniformly rewarded. Thus TP studies gen-
erally exclude end items from study.
uli, then two-tier simulations do display the SDE in aggre-
gate though not for every individual. On this qualitative level,
the results match those reported by McGonigle & Chalmers
(1992) for live subjects.
Age, Action and Learning
As further support for my hypothesis, I now propose a novel
explanation of the results of Rapp et al. (1996). It has gener-
ally been assumed that RT results are due to processing com-
plexity; for example that more sequential steps must be taken
to perform a task. But the model I am proposing here assumes
an any-time process (Dean & Boddy, 1988). An any-time
algorithm is one which can always generate some solution,
but that improves the solution the longer it has to compute.
In my proposal, the length of time given is determined by
the agent’s certainty about its next action, and controlled by
frontal-lobe inhibition. During the period of delay, the agent
visually and intellectually attends to the problem space, men-
tally exploring possible next acts until it becomes disinhib-
ited either because the inhibition fades naturally or because
the level is reset when a superior solution is discovered. As
I proposed in the introduction, the period of inhibition may
also be determined by age, growing shorter as an adult ages.
In the case of TP, the agent is unlikely to find another so-
lution because the task space is severely impoverished, as is
typical in artificial experimental settings. However, we are
still able to view the inhibitory aspect of this process, which
results in the SDE.
TP in Aged Monkeys (Rapp et al., 1996)
Support for this theory can be found in the work of Rapp et al.
(1996), on TP in aged monkeys. First, Rapp et al. show that
rhesus macaques of an advanced age (20-24 years) learn the
initial, adjacent pairs for TP in approximately the same time
as younger animals. Further, those that pass criteria in learn-
ing the pairs perform just as well as younger animals on the
transitive pairs. However, these aged animals do not exhibit
the SDE, but rather complete all transitive tests in the same
time, which is much faster than their younger conspecifics.
In general, RTs tend to increase with age, so this finding is
particularly remarkable. It also indicates that the SDE does
not reflect computational processing necessary for TP.
Second, due to an error in procedure, all monkeys received
an unusual reward schedule for the only transitive pair they
were initially tested on, BD. The error in procedure was as
follows. Bryant & Trabasso (1971), who originally spec-
ified the protocol for pre-operational TP, specified that the
test, transitive pairs should be “non-differentially rewarded”.
Since Bryant & Trabasso worked with children, the reward
consisted of thanking the child for any choice, but not telling
them whether they were right or wrong. This solution is not
typically seen as available for non-human species. McGo-
nigle & Chalmers (1977) reasoned that non-differential re-
ward should simply be reward regardless of choice. Since
well-trained subjects presumably expect reward for the choice
they have made, this schedule is the least disruptive available.
Rapp et al. however interpreted non-differential reward to
mean random reward. In the initial testing, they rewarded any
choice on BD with 50% probability. The subjects were then
trained on further adjacent pairs (EF and FG). Rapp et al.
were surprised to subsequently find that the younger animals,
while performing correctly on the newly-available transitive
pairs such as BE, CE, and DF , were now at chance on BD.
The aged monkeys however still performed correctly on BD.
The fact that the performance changed for the younger
adult animals after the unusual reward schedule (not on test
day) has subsequently been explained by Ellenbogen et al.
(2007), who show the importance of both delay and sleep for
learning TP implicitly. What is more relevant to the present
theory is the correlation between the lack of SDE in the aged
monkeys and the lack of effect of the random reward sched-
ule. This sustains my argument that the purpose of the period
of the SDE is in fact to explore alternative solutions which
leads as a side effect to learning.
Conclusion
In this article I have proposed two things:
1. A relatively novel explanation of reaction time effects in
action selection. This extends from the Wolfe et al. (2000)
account of reaction time for visual cognition.
2. A novel adaptationist explanation of why aged animals lose
frontal-lobe inhibition.
The explanation of reaction time effects is that animals allo-
cate time to be spent on search and learning based on how un-
certain they are of the next action they should perform. This
uncertainty triggers a level of inhibition which is also depen-
dent on a second factor — the age of the animal. The adapta-
tionist explanation for this latter dependency I have proposed
is that in a stable environment aged individuals can be ex-
pected to already know appropriate action, and in a chang-
ing environments the optimal average reproductive age for a
species may decrease.
Clearly at this point my hypotheses are speculative, as such
they motivate a good deal of future research. For example,
this model predicts that it may be possible to eliminate re-
action time effects (such as the symbolic-distance effect for
transitive performance) in human subjects, perhaps by dis-
tracting their attention with another task or by chemically al-
tering their level of inhibition. My hypothesis predicts that
the new RT will be directly correlated with the level of learn-
ing, but less so with the level of performance. In the present
paper I have supported my proposals in two ways:
• By providing the first explanation of previous findings by
Rapp et al. (1996), that aged monkeys express no SDE and
also do not detect changes to their reward schedule, and
• to extend the Bryson & Leong (2007) two-tiered model
of transitive performance to account for the symbolic-
distance effect.
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